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TORT LAW-THE EXPANSION OF THE VIABLE FETUS
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION - PARENTS' INDIVIDUAL
CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CAUSED BY CONCERN FOR A THIRD PARTY:
THE VIABLE FETUS - Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics
INTRODUCTION
Until 1987, the courts in North Carolina held that a stillborn
fetus was not considered a "person" whose personal representative
could pursue a N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-2 wrongful death action.1
North Carolina's delay' in accepting the cause of action is ex-
plained, among other rationale, as due to: first, the speculative na-
ture of assessing the pecuniary loss of an unborn and second, the
usual court concern with potential floodgate litigation. However, in
DiDonato v. Wortman,3 the North Carolina Supreme Court ex-
tended the wrongful death action to include the death of a viable
fetus." The DiDonato decision took North Carolina out of the
small category of states to deny a viable fetus wrongful death ac-
tion and linked this state with the increasing majority of jurisdic-
tions which offer the remedy.'
1. DiDonato v. Wortman, 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (1987). See Cardwell
v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 393, 213 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1975), cert. denied, 287 N.C.
464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975). The Wrongful Death Act states ". . . when the death
of a 'person' is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another, such as
would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages
therefor, the person liable or corporation that would have been so lia-
ble . . . shall be liable to an action for damages." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2
(1984).
2. Although the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act was originally enacted
in 1854, the issue of a viable fetus wrongful death claim was not presented to the
North Carolina Supreme Court until 1966 in Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146
S.E.2d 425 (1966). The North Carolina Court of Appeals has twice since denied
actions for the wrongful death of a stillborn child. See Yow v. Nance, 29 N.C.
App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976);
Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382 (1975), cert. denied, 287
N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975).
3. 320 N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489.
4. Id. at 434, 358 S.E.2d at 495. The court defined the viability of a fetus as
"capable of life independent of its mother." 320 N.C. at 427, 358 S.E.2d at 491.
5. Note, A Wrongful Death Action Can Be Maintained for Prenatal Injuries
Causing the Stillborn of a Fetus, 17 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 983, 998 (1986).
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The DiDonato decision left many issues of the viable fetus
wrongful death cause of action unsettled. A brief look at the issue
of damages illustrates an aspect of the DiDonato decision that re-
mains controversial.
Previously, North Carolina allowed only pecuniary loss recov-
ery in wrongful death actions.' Pecuniary loss is determined by de-
ducting decedent's probable living expenses from his probable
gross income. North Carolina courts viewed assessing a fetus'
probable gross income as sheer speculation.' This assessment diffi-
culty helps to explain North Carolina's delay in accepting a viable
fetus wrongful death action. However, in 1969, the North Carolina
Legislature expanded the damages available under the wrongful
death statute.' This expansion included punitive and nominal
damages. Because a variety of damages were available, the courts
could no longer justify denying a viable fetus a wrongful death ac-
tion simply because pecuniary loss assessment was speculative. Al-
though this expansion in recoverable wrongful death damages illus-
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-174 (superseded by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)).
Before 1969, a wrongful death action allowed recovery for only "such damages as
are fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such
death."
7. Purnell v. Rockingham R.R., 190 N.C. 573, 30 S.E. 313 (1925).
8. Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 402, 146 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1966).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1984 and Supp. 1985). The language of this
section provides:
(b) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the
injury resulting in death;
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons
entitled to receive the damages recovered, including but not limited to
compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected:
a. Net income of the decedent,
b. Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent,
whether voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the
damages recovered,
c. Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices
and advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages
recovered;
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had
he survived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of
the decedent through maliciousness, wilful or wanton injury, or gross
negligence;
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds.
[Vol. 11:91
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trates why North Carolina accepted a viable fetus wrongful death
action, the DiDonato case still left the issue of damages in
controversy.
DiDonato denied damages for the stillborn's loss of income. 10
Loss of income damages are normally available under a wrongful
death action." The court reasoned that such damages could be cal-
culated only by sheer speculation. 2 Damages for loss of services,
companionship, advice and the like were also denied for the same
reason. 3 The court allowed recovery for the child's pain and suf-
fering but stated that the court was not convinced that fetal pain
and suffering could ever be satisfactorily proven.' 4 Basically, the
only remaining allowable damages are medical expenses, funeral
expenses, and punitive and nominal damages where appropriate.15
DiDonato's reduction in recoverable damages greatly diminishes
the value of the viable fetus wrongful death cause of action. This
damage issue remains to be worked out among the courts. How-
ever, this Note will concentrate on the issue of floodgate litigation,
more particularly, whether the viable fetus wrongful 'death cause of
action should expand to include the parents' own claim for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress.
Only months passed before DiDonato's floodgate concern
seemed to materialize. The North Carolina courts quickly faced
their next viable fetus wrongful death action in Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics." In Johnson, the North Carolina Court of Appeals al-
lowed the parents to join, with the stillborn wrongful death action,
a cause of action in their own rights for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress arising from the negligently caused death of their
viable fetus.' 7 Despite DiDonato's concern with floodgate litigation
and frivolous future claims, the parents' claims are within the
DiDonato accepted expansion of the viable fetus wrongful death
action. A cause of action by the parents for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress should come as no surprise since the
DiDonato decision foreshadowed its occurrence. DiDonato denied
loss of service, companionship, advice, and similar losses in the via-
10. 320 N.C. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
11. See infra note 9.
12. 320 N.C. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
13. Id. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 909 (1988).
17. Id. at 171, 365 S.E.2d at 919.
1988]
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ble fetus wrongful death action. 8 In a footnote, the court ex-
plained that the mother would presumably recover these damages
in an action brought in her own right.19 Also, DiDonato, anticipat-
ing that the viable fetus wrongful death action would expand to
include the parents' claim, held that all parents' claims in their
own right, based on the same facts, must be joined with the still-
born fetus wrongful death cause of action.2"
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Johnson saw the need
to provide a means of recovery for parents whose emotional dis-
tress results from the negligently caused death of their own viable
fetus. This Note will examine the rationale of the Johnson decision
and illustrate how a parent's claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress is a natural extension of a viable fetus wrongful
death action. Also, the Note addresses why the Johnson case pro-
vides a concrete example for the policy that the business of the
courts is to make precedent where a wrong calls for redress, even if
lawsuits must be multiplied.2'
THE CASE
In Johnson, Glenn and Barbara Johnson sued the physicians
for the wrongful death of their full term fetus, their individual
emotional distress, compensatory, and punitive damages.2 Plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendants negligently failed to treat Mrs.
Johnson's diabetic condition during the entire term of the full
term pregnancy, causing their infant to die in utero of malnutri-
tion.213 Because the DiDonato case, allowing a viable fetus wrongful
death action in North Carolina, had not yet been decided, the trial
court granted defendant's motion to dismiss all claims. 24
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. 25 The court of
appeals retroactively applied the DiDonato decision and allowed
the action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus in Johnson.2"
The court also allowed the parents' own cause of action for negli-
18. 320 N.C. at 432, 358 S.E.2d at 494.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 434, 358 S.E.2d at 495.
21. Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540
(1930).
22. 89 N.C. App. at 156, 365 S.E.2d at 910.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 171, 365 S.E.2d at 919.
26. Id. at 159, 365 S.E.2d at 912.
[Vol. 11:91
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gent infliction of emotional distress.27 The court reasoned that in
North Carolina, there no longer existed an absolute prohibition
against recovery for negligent inflicition of emotional distress
caused by concern for another.28 The court allowed recovery for
the mother based on the presence of a physical injury.29 The court
reasoned that since a physical injury to the fetus was a physical
injury to the mother, the physical injury or impact requirement in
a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was satisfied.30
The court also allowed recovery for the father's claim31 stating that
in North Carolina, an allegation of mental anguish suffices for an
allegation of physical injury in emotional distress claims. 2 Because
the father alleged mental anguish in his complaint, the physical
injury requirement was properly pleaded. 33 In addition, the court
held that the father's claim was not too remote or unforeseeable to
require dismissal as a matter of public policy.3 4
BACKGROUND - GENERAL
The law has been slow to accept the interest of freedom from
mental disturbance as an independent cause of action.3 5 Justifica-
tions offered for this delay include: difficulty in measuring mental
disturbance in financial terms,36 remoteness of mental injury re-
sulting in questionable proximate cause,3 7 and fear of potential
floodgate litigation.38 However, emotional suffering should be no
more difficult to measure than physical suffering. 39 Also, the law
27. Id. at 171, 365 S.E.2d at 919.
28. Id. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915.
29. Id. at 167, 365 S.E.2d at 917.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 170, 365 S.E.2d at 918.
32. Id. at 168, 365 S.E.2d at 917.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 169, 365 S.E.2d at 918. See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 54 (5th ed. 1984).
35. Green v. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Annotation, Right to Recover
for Emotional Disturbance or its Physical Consequences in the Absence of Im-
pact or Other Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2D 100 (1959). Bohlen, Right to Recover for In-
jury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 41 Am. L. Reg., N.S. 141 (1902).
36. Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
37. Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 4 (1909).
38. Spade, 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1896).
39. Goodrich, Emotional Distrubance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497
(1922). See Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
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has an interest in protecting people's mental as well as physical
well being. Despite this important emotional interest, the law con-
tinues to stall in accepting mental distress as a separate cause of
action. The courts' justifications for not accepting the action in-
clude: the harm is often temporary, claims are easily falsified, and
damages are perceived as grossly disproportionate compared espe-
cially to a negligent wrongdoing.40
The majority of courts deny liability for a negligently caused
mental injury that is not accompanied by some sort of physical
injury or impact. The physical injury requirement helps to ensure
the existence of an actual mental harm.41 As time passed, many
courts liberalized the impact requirement to such a slight touch,
that frequently the impact is not responsible for the emotional in-
jury."2 When physical injury accompanies the mental claim, courts
are more willing to offer redress since the physical injury offers as-
surance of a legitimate claim."3 This physical injury manifestation
replaced the once required impact on plaintiff in most jurisdic-
tions.4 Where genuine and serious mental disturbance has a spe-
cial likelihood of occurring from the circumstances, many jurisdic-
tions created exceptions to the physical injury requirement by
assuming that physical injury is present. The courts' exceptions in-
clude the negligent mishandling of corpses and the negligent trans-
mission of death messages by telegraph companies. 5
Advances in the field of psychology have made measuring emotional damage more
possible and accurate. Who is to say that one can place a price tag on physical
injury with less speculation than on an emotional injury?
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 435A comment 6 (1965).
41. Id. at § 436A. See Balto Tractor Co. v. Wallace, 77 Md. 435, 26 A. 518
(1893); McMahon v. N.C.R.R., 39 Md. 438 (1874); Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry.
Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902); Ewing v. Pittsburg C.C. & St. L.R. Co.,
147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892); Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Distur-
bance or its Physical Consequences in the Absence of Impact or Other Wrong, 64
A.L.R.2D 100, 134-143 (1959).
42. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 34, § 54. See also Porter v. Delaware, L.
& W.R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1906) (impact requirement
satisfied by dust in the eye); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869
(1930) (smoke inhaled constituted sufficient impact).
43. Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 631 P.2d 1314 (1981).
44. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, -, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181
(1982); Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, -, 143 A.2d 588, 597 (1958), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 30 N.J. 485, 153 A.2d 833 (1959).
45. Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Similar Institution for Giving Erro-
neous Notification of Patient's Death, 77 A.L.R.3D 501 (1977); Towns v. Ander-
son, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380
[Vol. 11:91
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Liability has generally not been extended to create a cause of
action by third persons whose mental disturbance is caused by wit-
nessing harm to another."' Primarily, this denial is because the de-
fendant cannot reasonably anticipate harm to the third person and
owes him no duty of care.47 However, when the third person stands
in the zone of danger of physical harm, the duty to this person is
breached. 48 Therefore, when injury occurs through an unexpected
means (i.e., mental disturbance caused by concern for another), re-
covery is frequently allowed. 9 A majority of jurisdictions have
adopted the Zone of Danger Theory for limiting negligent liabil-
ity. 0 In fact, the Restatement Second of Torts has adopted the
Zone of Danger Theory.5 1
Unsatisfied with the arbitrary spatial limitations of the Zone
of Danger Theory, however, the California Supreme Court allowed
recovery beyond the zone of danger in the famous case of Dillion v.
Legg.2 The Dillion court opted for a new theory commonly re-
ferred to as either the general foreseeability test or the "Dillion
test." The Dillion test provides that a bystander's mental harm is
foreseeable if the bystander: first, is physically near the accident;
N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
46. Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury
to Another or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3D
1137 (1970).
47. Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952).
48. See infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
49. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969); An-
notation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to Another
or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3D 1337 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Amana v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 259, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444
A.2d 433, 435 (Me. 1982); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176
N.E.2d 729 (1961); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). The
bystander plaintiff, being in the zone of danger, offers adequate proof for the gen-
uineness of his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, since within the
zone of danger, plaintiff is more likely to fear for his own well being.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 313(2) (1965). This section reads as
follows: "(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or
bodily harm of another which is caused by emotional distress arising solely from
harm or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise
created an unreasonable risk or bodily harm to the other."
Subsection (1) simply sets forth that an actor is liable for negligently caused
emotional distress to another if he knew or should have known that his conduct
involved an unreasonable risk or might result in bodily harm.
52. Dillion v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80, 441 P.2d 912, 920
(1968).
19881
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second, observes the accident personally and contemporaneously;
and third, is closely related to the victim. 3 Since 1968, many juris-
dictions have adopted the Dillion test.54
BACKGROUND - NORTH CAROLINA
The Johnson decision approached the issue of whether to al-
low the parents' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress
from two perspectives: first, peril of another recovery prohibition;
and second, a physical injury impact requirement .5 Therefore, the
history of both lines of reasoning is pertinent.
As early as 1913, the North Carolina courts denied recovery
for mental harm caused by concern for the well being of another.6
In 1925, North Carolina established an absolute prohibition
against any recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress
caused by concern for another. The case, Hinnant v. Tidewater
Power Co.,57 involved a consortium claim. 8 The Hinnant court
spoke in terms of lack of proximate cause justifying the prohibi-
53. Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury
to Another or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3D
1337 (1970).
54. Lantry, An Expanding Legal Duty: The Recovery of Damages for
Mental Anguish by Those Observing Tortious Activity, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 214, 219
(1981). As of early 1982, many jurisdictions had adopted the Dillion test:
D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973);
Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Barnhill v. Davis, 300
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarket, Inc., 444 A.2d 433,
435 (Me. 1982); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978);
Williams v. Citizens Mut. Ins. Co. of America, 94 Mich. App. 762, 290 N.W.2d 76
(1980); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84
N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979);
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Landreth v. Reed,
570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553
P.2d 1096 (1976).
55. 89 N.C. App. 154, 365 S.E.2d 909.
56. Ferebee v. Norfolk So. R.R., 163 N.C. 351, 355, 79 S.E. 685, 686 (1913).
Plaintiff was denied recovery for distress he endured worrying about his family's
well-being after defendant negligently injured plaintiff.
57. 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925). In the law, mental anguish is restricted
as a rule to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the
person himself as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which accom-
panies sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises from a contem-
plation of wrongs committed on the person of another. But see Nicholson v. Hugh
Chatham Memorial Hospital, Inc., 300 N.C. 295 at 300, 266 S.E.2d 818 at 821
(1980).
58. 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
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tion. In Williamson v. Bennett,59 the court further extended the
proximate cause rationale by denying recovery due to remoteness.6 0
The Hinnant absolute prohibition against recovery for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress arising from concern for an-
other ended in 1980. Hinnant was expressly overruled in Nichol-
son v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, Inc. 1 Nicholson
rejected the too remote for measurement argument when applied
to spousal concern for a spouse's negligently inflicted injuries.2
Where some intimate relationships are concerned, the absolute
prohibition against recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress arising out of concern for another is abolished.' However,
in 1982 the court in Wyatt v. Gilmore64 held that this prohibition
exception is harnessed by public policy requirements that the
mental injury must be proximately caused by defendant's
negligence.65
The physical injury requirement in a negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action underwent many changes in
North Carolina during its development this century. Historically,
North Carolina denied recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress unless coincidental in time and place, and an actual
physical impact or genuine physical injury occurred. However,
59. 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960).
60. Id. at 508, 112 S.E.2d at 55. Recovery was denied for plaintiffs mental
anguish suffered when she erroneously thought she had run over a child. The ra-
tionale of the decision was based in part on her concern for another.
61. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818.
62. Id. at 304, 266 S.E.2d at 823.
63. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915.
64. 57 N.C. App. 57, 290 S.E.2d 790 (1982).
65. Id. at 61-62, 290 S.E.2d at 793. Although a fixed formula used to decide
issues of remoteness and proximate cause is impossible in advance of each case,
the Wyatt decision summarized public policy limitations to be considered:
1. whether the injury is reasonably close in time and location to the act
of the tortfeasor;
2. whether the extent of the injury is wholly out of proportion to the
culpability of the tortfeasor;
3. whether in retrospect it is too highly extraordinary that the act of the
tortfeasor caused the injury;
4. whether recovery would place an unreasonable burden upon those en-
gaged in activities similar to that of the tortfeasor;
5. whether recovery would likely open the way for fraudulent claims; and
6. whether recovery would enter a field with no sensible or just stopping
place.
66. State v. Boone, 307 N.C. 198, 297 S.E.2d 585 (1982); Craven v. Chambers,
1988]
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the physical injury requirement has been somewhat flexible. As
early as 1911 in May v. Western Tel. Co.,67 North Carolina held
that a mental injury would suffice for the physical injury require-
ment since the former was often equally, if not more serious." This
rationale expanded the number of cases that could fulfill the phys-
ical injury requirement, thus making the action less difficult to
maintain. North Carolina continues to adhere to this policy., 9 Fur-
ther evidence that the physical injury requirement is flexible can
be seen in cases that hold that physical injury is not required
where "coincident in time and place with the occurrence producing
the mental stress, some actual physical impact is caused to the
plaintiff. ' 70 Recent decisions outside North Carolina have rejected
requiring separate allegation or proof of physical injury for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claims when mental injury is
56 N.C. App. 151, 287 S.E.2d 905 (1982); Woodell v. Pinehurst Surgical Clinic, 78
N.C. App. 230, 336 S.E.2d 716 (1985), afj'd per curiam, 316 N.C. 550, 342 S.E.2d
523 (1986).
67. 157 N.C. 327, 72 S.E.2d 1059 (1911).
68. Id. at 332, 72 S.E.2d at 1061. Furthermore, where the claim for emotional
distress is otherwise proper, our courts do not bar recovery simply because strictly
separating "physical" from "mental" injuries is difficult. See Wesley v. Grey-
hound, 47 N.C. App. 680, 691, 268 S.E.2d 855, 862-63 (1980) (holding general
principles of the law of torts support a right of action for physical injuries result-
ing from either a willful or a negligent act none the less strongly because the
physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of wounded or lacer-
ated limbs, as those of the former class are frequently much more painful and
enduring than those of the latter).
69. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 199, 254 S.E.2d 611, 623 (1979). See
also Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 404, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933). Physical in-
jury in this sense is not used in its ordinary dictionary meaning. Instead it means
an injury which is capable of objective determination. See Vance v. Vance, 286
Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
Examples in other jurisdictions that have allowed recovery for physical in-
jury, using this interpretation which includes mental injury are: Petition of
United States, 418 F.2d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 1969) (depression, emotionally upset
and inablility to continue working at sea); D'Ambra v. United States, 396 F.
Supp. 1180, 1183 (D.C.R.I. 1973) (psychoneurosis, loss of appetite, insomnia,
nightmares of accidents); Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249
P.2d 843 (1952) (jury instruction upheld which stated that a definite nervous dis-
turbance or disorder is classified as a physical injury); Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich.
4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970) (loss of weight, inability to perform household chores,
extreme nervousness and irritability); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207
N.W.2d 140 (1973) (withdrawal from socialization and for nine months unable to
function, depression); Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W. 335 (1931) (ner-
vous prostration).
70. Williamson, 251 N.C. at 503, 112 S.E.2d at 52.
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present. 1
ANALYSIS
Throughout this century, the United States engaged in a pro-
cess of adopting theories that expanded liablility for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress caused by concern for another (lia-
bility to a bystander). 2 The physical impact theory is the most
restrictive theory in terms of affording liability. North Carolina's
adherence to the impact rule is explained by the lack of opportu-
nity to rule on this issue.73
This analysis illustrates that the court of appeals in Johnson
properly allowed recovery for the parents' claim by applying the
physical injury and impact theory. At the same time, a strong ar-
gument exists for adding this case to the list of exceptions 4 that
allow recovery without physical impact or injury because the na-
ture of the cases ensure that mental distrubance has a special like-
lihood of occurring. Applying the facts of this case, the plaintiffs
arguably would also recover under the majority Zone of Danger
Theory or the Dillion reasonable foreseeability theory.75 Analysis
of the Johnson holding illustrates that the parent's recovery under
established North Carolina law, is a natural extension of the viable
fetus wrongful death action. The facts and circumstances of the
Johnson case also provide the North Carolina Supreme Court with
an excellent opportunity to join the ranks of other states by adopt-
ing a more progressive theory. Later analyisis of these theories in-
dicates that adoption of a new theory of liability would render a
just result in North Carolina.
A. Parents' Recovery is Proper Under Existing North Carolina
Law.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Johnson reversed the
71. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831,
616 P.2d 813 (1980); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (refer-
ring to the physical injury requirement as "yet another of the artificial devices to
guarantee the genuineness of a claim which may actually foreclose a relief to a
genuine claim."); Saint Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
72. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
73. Woodell, 78 N.C. App. 230, 336 S.E.2d 716, aff'd per curiam, 316 N.C.
550, 342 S.E.2d 523.
74. See supra note 45.
75. Culbert, 444 A.2d 433.
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trial court's dismissal of the parents' claims. This decision allowed
an action for wrongful death of a viable fetus as well as the par-
ents' claims in their own right for negligent infliction of emotional
distress arising from the death of the fetus.76
The Johnson court began by applying retroactively the North
Carolina decision in DiDonato, announced only months prior,
which permitted an action for the wrongful death of a viable fe-
tus.77 The parents individually claimed negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.7 8 The parents alleged that their distress resulted
from enduring labor with the knowledge that the unborn child was
dead, the delivery of the dead child, and the dramatic circum-
stances surrounding the stillbirth of the child.79
The Johnson court noted, in addressing the parents' claims,
that the defendants challenged on two grounds.80 First, defendants
pointed out that on occasion, North Carolina courts denied recov-
ery for mental anguish caused by concern for the peril of another.8
Defendants contended that the plaintiffs' concern was for the peril
of another-the viable fetus.82 Second, defendants contended that
the plaintiffs' emotional distress was not the proximate result of an
actual physical impact or did not manifest itself by a genuine
physical injury.8 3 Because the physical impact or injury require-
ments were lacking, defendants contended that recovery should be
denied in North Carolina.8 '
The Johnson court stated in reference to the offered defenses
that the absolute prohibition against compensating emotional dis-
tress arising from injuries to others has been overruled.8 5 Where
some intimate relationships are involved, recovery is allowed be-
cause emotional injury is not too remote for measurement. 6 This
intimate relationship exception is harnessed by public policy fac-
tors that the court stated should be weighed when emotional injury
76. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 171, 365 S.E.2d at 919.
77. Id. at 159, 365 S.E.2d at 912.
78. Id. at 156, 365 S.E.2d at 910.
79. Id. at 162, 365 S.E.2d at 914.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915.
86. Id.
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is arguably too remote. 7 The court agreed that injury or impact is
required in North Carolina. However, the court stated that it was
solid North Carolina law that either impact or injury will suffice
and that both are not required.8 8 The court added that mental in-
jury will suffice for a physical manifestation of the emotional
harm."
The court granted relief for the mother's claim of negligent
infliction of emotional harm.90 The court reasoned that the physi-
cian's failure to treat the mother's diabetes for the full term of the
pregnancy amounte#[, to a potential physical injury and impact to
the mother herself9 The court also granted relief for the father's
claim. " The court stated that allegations of mental anguish were
sufficient to allege physical injury. 3 Before a dismissal is granted,
the defendants must demonstrate that no forecast of evidence
could entitle plaintiff to recover.9 ' As stated earlier, mental
anguish will suffice for the physical injury requirement of a negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claim. Because the father's
complaint alleged mental anguish, the court held dismissal was
improper because it could not be held that as a matter of law that
there existed no forecast of evidence that could prove the physical
injury.9 5 The court later held that the father's mental injury arising
from his concern for his son was not too remote to be barred by
public policy.98
Basically, the Johnson decision is a direct application of ex-
isting North Carolina law to a new fact situation. The court ap-
plied the physical impact-injury theory long adhered to in North
Carolina to ensure the genuineness of the claim and set a limit on
liability. However, considering the floodgate litigation concern ex-
pressed in DiDonato, the North Carolina Supreme Court might
place greater weight on defendants' objections and question the
court of appeals' interpretation of North Carolina law. Therefore,
87. Id. at 164, 365 S.E.2d at 916. See supra note 65 for public policy
considerations.
88. 89 N.C. App. at 165, 365 S.E.2d at 916.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 166, 365 S.E.2d at 916.
92. Id. at 167, 365 S.E.2d at 917.
93. Id. at 168, 365 S.E.2d at 918.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 170, 365 S.E.2d at 918.
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potential problems with the Johnson case should be addressed and
dismissed.
The defendants contended that their failure to treat the dia-
betes for the full term of the pregnancy, resulting in the fetus'
death, was not an injury or impact to the mother.9 7 Defendants
reasoned that the fetus had reached the independent stage of via-
bility."8 The supreme court should reject this argument as did the
court of appeals.9 9 First of all, the argument lacks logic. Setting all
legal, philosophical, and technical arguments aside momentarily, it
should be common sense that an injury of the maginitude to kill an
unborn fetus inside the mother's body necessarily has an impact
on the mother. Undoubtedly this death causes the mother some
sort of physical injury. Second, notwithstanding the effect on the
fetus, the failure to treat the mother's diabetes for nine months is
a breach of duty to the mother directly, causing impact and physi-
cal injury to the mother's body in general.100 Third, as noted ear-
lier, the impact requirement has been diminished to a slight touch-
ing and can be easily fulfilled. In light of the slight touchings
accepted as impact in other jurisdictions, North Carolina should
accept the argument that because the mother and fetus are at-
tached by the uterine wall, an injury to the fetus is an impact on
the mother. Finally, persuasive authority supports the finding that
for mental distress claims, an injury to a fetus is also an injury to
the mother. 11
The defendants' main argument for viable fetus independence
focused on a North Carolina case that imputed the legal fiction of
personhood to a fetus for some purposes. 02 The Johnson court dis-
tinguished the case by stating that personhood imputed to a fetus
for some purposes does not determine whether a fetal injury is im-
97. Id. at 166, 365 S.E.2d at 917.
98. Id. at 166, 365 S.E.2d at 918.
99. Id. at 167, 365 S.E.2d at 914.
100. Id. at 167, 365 S.E.2d at 917. The defendants contended that the court
had previously recognized a fetus as a separate entity in Stare v. State, 47 N.C.
App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980), aff'd in relevant part, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d
439 (1981). Because of this separate entity theory, a fetal injury cannot necessa-
rily be imputed to the mother. The court of appeals held that the Stam court's
recognition of separate "personhood" could not be applied only for certain pur-
poses. The Johnson court used the DiDonato definition of viability meaning capa-
ble of life independent of its mother. See Johnson at 159, 365 S.E.2d at 913.
101. Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 348 S.E.2d 233 (1986).
102. Stam, 47 N.C. App. at 218, 267 S.E.2d 335 at 342, affd in relevant part,
302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439.
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pact or injury on a mother.103 An in-depth analysis on the per-
sonhood of a fetus would be too involved at this point.0 4 Suffice it
to say that the above arguments should persuade that an injury to
a fetus is impact on a mother. However, if the court disagrees with
the above arguments as well as the court of appeals' rationale, and
holds that an injury to the fetus is not an injury to the mother,
then recovery would still be proper. Even if the fetus is considered
a third party, the court could properly grant relief under negligent
infliction of emotional distress caused by concern for a third per-
son as discussed below.
Defendants contended that the parents' recovery should be
denied because North Carolina did not allow recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress caused simply by concern for an-
other.0 5 The Johnson court rejected the argument and interpreted
the Nicholson case to apply to the fact situation at hand. 0 6 Al-
though the court's interpretation was natural and logical, a brief
analysis should follow in support of the court's interpretation.
Nicholson overruled the absolute prohibition against recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by concern for an-
other.10 7 The Nicholson court found that recovery for a spouse's
emotional injury suffered as a result of witnessing negligently in-
flicted injury to his spouse was not too remote for measurement.'
The Johnson court interpreted the decision to mean that "where
some intimate relationships are affected, there is no longer any ab-
solute prohibition against compensating emotional distress arising
from injuries to others."' 0 9 Johnson applied the interpretation to
the parent-child relationship and allowed recovery."0
The North Carolina Court of Appeals' interpretation should
not be disturbed for many reasons. First, the interpretation ap-
103. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 167, 365 S.E.2d at 917.
104. See DiDonato, 320.N.C. 423, 358 S.E.2d 489 (discussing personhood of a
fetus).
105. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 162, 365 S.E.2d at 914. North Carolina had
denied recovery because damages were to be confined to those that were consid-
ered the natural and proximate result of defendant's negligence. Injury to a third
party was considered too remote and unforeseeable, extending defendant's liabil-
ity beyond accepted limits. See Williamson, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48; Hin-
nant, 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307; Ferebee, 163 N.C. 282, 285, 79 S.E. 685, 686.
106. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915.
107. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 300, 266 S.E.2d at 821.
108. Id. at 302, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
109. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 163, 365 S.E.2d at 915.
110. Id. at 170, 365 S.E. 2d at 915.
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peals to sound logic considering the close relationship between a
mother and her fetus. Second, it can be argued that the Johnson
decision is not an expansion of Nicholson but is within the bound-
aries of the North Carolina Supreme Court exception declared in
Nicholson. Logically speaking, in our society, many parent-child
relationships are built of stronger emotional ties than spousal rela-
tionships. Considering this concept, the justification for the estab-
lished Nicholson spousal extension will frequently be weaker than
the proposed Johnson parent-child extension. Third, as argued in
Johnson, the parent-child relationship is well within the public
policy limitation on liablility referred to earlier in Wyatt-to ensure
against unforeseeable liability."' And finally, the general tort prin-
ciple should be remembered-that to be held liable for negligence,
the extraordinary consequences or means of consequences need not
be foreseen. 12 Instead, the physician need only be aware of the
risk of danger his omission creates. 13 Surely, any doctor using rea-
sonable care would be aware of the effect of not treating a preg-
nant woman's diabetes and the likelihood of emotional distress re-
sulting from the death of the fetus. The defendants next
contended that the father's claim should be denied because he
failed to allege impact or physical injury."" The court's ruling, al-
lowing the father's claim, involves no major substantive issue for
the supreme court to overrule. The court of appeals referred to
111. Wyatt, 57 N.C. App. at 162, 290 S.E.2d at 793. The following analysis
utilizes the factors set forth in Wyatt to illustrate that the father's claim in John-
son is within the public policy limits of foreseeability: (1) The emotional injury is
a direct result and immediate result of the physician's negligence; (2) The extent
of the injury is not out of proportion to the culpability of the tortfeasor. This is
because basic human feelings should favor compensation for the innocent mother
losing her child as opposed to finding the negligent physician not liable; (3) In
retrospect, it is not too highly extraordinary that the negligent act caused the
injury because death by malnutrition is the obvious result of a physician's 'failure
to treat the mother's diabetes for the full term pregnancy. Also, the mother's
emotional distress is a natural result of her child's negligently caused death; (4)
Liability will not overburden physicians since treating the mother's diabetes dur-
ing pregnancy should be common practice; (5) Recovery here will not open the
way for fraudulent claims because the close emotional attachments between par-
ent and child ensure the genuineness of the plaintiff parents' claim; (6) This case
does not risk entering a field with no just stopping point since the Johnson deci-
sion limits liability to the parents. This extension is within the Nicholson
exception.
112. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 34, § 43, at 281.
113. Id. at 280.
114. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 167, 365 S.E.2d at 917.
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Woodell v. Pinehurst115 and Campbell v. Pitt County Memorial
Hospital, Inc."6 in stating that in North Carolina, a defendant
must show that the plaintiff neither offered nor forecasted evi-
dence of physical injury in order to be entitled to a dismissal."'
However, the court distinguished the Johnson case on the fact that
in Woodell and Campbell, summary judgment had been entered
after discovery and trial evidence. In Johnson, the dismissal was
granted after the pleadings only under Rule 12(c). 118 Because dis-
missal was entered after the pleadings, the father should be al-
lowed to show whether his alleged mental anguish would manifest
itself into actual physical injury. 9 The court continued to apply
the same analysis discussed earlier in reference to the mother's
claim to illustrate that recovery by the father was within the North
Carolina public policy limitations to liability. 20 Provided that the
father can show mental injury, the above analysis regarding the
mother's recovery applies to the father's recovery as well.' 2' The
birth and death of a child is an experience endured by both the
mother and the father, and the father's emotional distress is
equally foreseeable. Therefore, the court should make no distinc-
tion regarding recovery based on whether the plaintiff is a mother
or a father.
As the foregoing indicates, the facts in the Johnson case fall
within established North Carolina law. The parents' own cause of
action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out
of concern for their child is therefore a natural extension of the
DiDonato viable fetus wrongful death claim.
Since the Johnson decision is limited to parents, it poses no
threat to the normal policy concerns of ensuring genuine claims
and limiting the scope of liability. The North Carolina impact or
physical injury rule successfully ensures a genuine claim and limits
liability in this case. However, the line drawn to limit liability
115. 78 N.C. App. 230, 336 S.E.2d 716, aff'd per curiam, 316 N.C. 550, 342
S.E.2d 523 (1986).
116. 84 N.C. App. 314, 352 S.E.2d 902, aff'd, 319 N.C. 458, 356 S.E.2d 2
(1987).
117. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 168, 365 S.E.2d at 918.
118. Id. N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(c) requires that before a case is dismissed on the
pleadings, one must show that the opponent has shown no forecast of evidence
that would entitle him to recovery.
119. Id. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 169, 365 S.E.2d at 919.
121. See infra note 111.
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must be meaningful and not arbitrary. Advancements in medical
science have eliminated the need to confine liability for negligent
infliction of emotional distress to only those cases where the plain-
tiff suffers physical impact. 122 Genuine emotional distress can now
be ascertained more accurately.' 23 Other jurisdictions throughout
this century have recognized the need to extend liability beyond
the impact theory to include meritorious but otherwise deniable
claims."" As a result of this recognition, many jurisdictions have
adopted alternative theories that draw new and less arbitrary lines
to limit liability.'25 Jurisdictions extending liability beyond the im-
pact theory allow recovery for: (1) plaintiffs in situations where
emotional distress has a special likelihood of occurring; 21 (2) third
party plaintiffs who are also within the zone of danger of the origi-
nal risk created by the defendant;127 and (3) plaintiffs whose emo-
tional harm is reasonably foreseeable as a result of the risk created
by defendant. 128
B. Parents' Recovery is Proper Under Other Theories.
Although not discussed by the Johnson court, a brief look at
the more progressive theories illustrates that recovery in the John-
son case is proper under each theory. The Johnson case provides
the North Carolina Supreme Court with an excellent and rare op-
portunity to adopt a more just and progressive theory on the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress caused by concern for another.
1. Special Likelihood Cases
Many jurisdictions have expanded liability beyond physical
impact or injury in cases where there exists "an especial likelihood
of genuine and serious mental distress, arising from the special cir-
cumstances which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not
spurious.' 29 Two widely recognized exceptions include permitting
recovery for: first, emotional harm resulting from negligent trans-
122. Culbert, 444 A.2d at 435.
123. In fact, a close brush with risk in many cases can cause more severe
emotional distress than one resulting in actual physical impact or injury.
124. See supra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 45.
127. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
129. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 34, § 54, at 362.
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mission by a telegraph company of a message announcing death;1 0
and second, emotional harm to a close relative resulting from neg-
ligent mishandling of a corpse.131 Prosser, the leading scholar in
the field of torts, notes that more exceptions will likely be created
for other types of cases.132
One example of a new exception carved out is the case of
Johnson v. State.133 Johnson v. State allowed the relative of a hos-
pital patient to recover for emotional harm sustained as a result of
negligent misinformation given by the hospital that the patient
had died."' Rationales justifying these exceptions include: first,
the obvious close kinship and sentimental attachment of the plain-
tiff to the loved one involved;1 35 and second, the fact that the de-
fendant was especially aware of the deep emotional ramifications
of his conduct.1 38
The Johnson v. Ruark case at hand has the ingredients to cre-
ate a new exception: first, immediate family close kinship; and sec-
ond, high emotional sensitivity surrounding the death of a loved
one combined with a physician who certainly is aware of the deep
emotional ramifications of his conduct. The physician's awareness
of the risk of emotional harm is especially true here considering
the extreme sensitive and emotional state of parents as they go
through childbirth. By limiting the exception to the parents, the
present Johnson decision ensures the genuineness of the claim and
limits the scope of liability for this exception. The North Carolina
Supreme Court should seriously consider creating this exception.
130. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743
(1930); Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895).
131. See, e.g., Holland v. Edgerton, 85 N.C. App. 567, 355 S.E.2d 514, 518
(1987); Russ v. Western Union Tele. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943); Mor-
row v. Southern R. Co., 213 N.C. 127, 195 S.E. 383 (1938). See also Chelini v.
Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 372
N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590 (1975); Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Similar
Institution for Giving Erroneous Notification of Patient's Death, 77 A.L.R.3D
501 (1977).
132. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 34, § 54, at 362.
133. 37 N.Y.2d 378, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590.
134. Id. at -, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 643, 334 N.E.2d at 593.
135. Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 P. 151 (1913); Carson v. Chase,
47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238, (1891).
136. Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948); Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 68 S.W. 433, (1902); Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 33
(1915).
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2. Zone of Danger Cases
As the century progressed, many jurisdictions declined to fol-
low the impact rule. Advances in medical science eliminated the
once perceived need to define the tortfeasor's liability so nar-
rowly.'37 As stated earlier, courts no longer found a justified dis-
tinction between valid and invalid claims based on impact, because
impact had become diluted to a slight touching.'38 This arbitrary
line drawn to limit liability led courts to adopt the Zone of Danger
Theory. The Zone of Danger Theory limits liability beyond physi-
cal impact and allows recovery for bystander plaintiffs who are
within the zone of risk created by the negligent act.139 The courts
felt that a bystander fearing for his own safety added credibility to
his claim and helped to ensure genuine emotional distress. 14 0 Also,
the zone of danger provided a definite line beyond which courts
could limit liability.14 ' Juries could objectively and effectively de-
termine liability based on whether the plaintiff's fear was for him-
self.142 The Zone of Danger Theory would provide recovery for
more meritorious claims that fell short of fulfilling the physical im-
pact requirement. By 1968, most states had forsaken the physical
impact rule in favor of the Zone of Danger Theory.4 3
The Johnson case should be affirmed under the Zone of Dan-
ger Theory. The risk created by the physician's omission in failing
to treat Mrs. Johnson's diabetes for the full pregnancy term posed
an immediate and great threat to her own body, causing Mrs.
Johnson to fear for her own safety.14 Mrs. Johnson was definitely
within the zone of danger created by the physician's negligence.
The father would also recover under Zone of Danger Theory. The
zone of danger is not restricted to physical danger; emotional in-
jury will also suffice.' 5 The distinction between the mother and
the father is indefensible in denying recovery for the father. One
137. Wallace v. Coco-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
138. See supra note 42.
139. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.497 (1935).
140. Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969).
141. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, (Minn. 1980).
142. Id.
143. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr.
33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176
N.E.2d 729 (1961); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
144. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 166, 365 S.E.2d at 916.
145. Lantry, supra note 54, at 215.
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parent is as much entitled to recovery as the other. 14 6 With this in
mind, the father's emotional injury is also within the zone of dan-
ger created by the physician's negligence and therefore recovery is
proper. Considering the above analysis, North Carolina could join
the majority of jurisdictions by adopting the Zone of Danger The-
ory and allowing recovery for both of the Johnson parents.
3. "Dillion Test" Cases
Many jurisdictions hold that the zone of danger is an unneces-
sary and rigid line used to limit liability.147 These courts feel that
liability should be extended beyond fearing for one's own safety
because there are cases beyond the zone of danger where there is
no doubting the claim's genuineness. 148 Also, the judiciary has a
responsibility to award damages to those with meritorious claims.
Therefore, these jurisdictions have adopted the Dillion test, also
known as the reasonable foreseeability test.149 The reasonable fore-
seeability test first adopted in Dillion,150 applies general tort prin-
ciples to set the limits of liability. A defendant is liable only for
injuries to others if the injuries were reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant at the time of the negligent act.15 ' The three guidelines
set out in Dillion to determine reasonable foreseeability include:
first, whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the acci-
dent, as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it; sec-
ond, whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon the plaintiff from the sensory or contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident
from others after its occurence; and third, whether the plaintiff
and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence
of a relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.152
All three factors enhance the likelihood that the defendant will
have foreseen the harm caused by his negligence. Of course, these
guidelines are to be applied on a case by case basis. As stated ear-
lier, many jurisdictions have adopted the Dillion test since the
146. Id.
147. Dillion, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912.
148. See supra note 54.
149. Id.
150. Dillon at 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d at 912.
151. Id. at -, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79, 441 P.2d at 919.
152. Id. at _, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920.
19881
21
Batchelor: Tort Law - The Expansion of the Viable Fetus Wrongful Death Actio
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
1968 decision.1"3
Recovery is proper for the Johnson parents under the Dillion
test. The parents certainly were located near the scene of the acci-
dent. Of course, the mother cannot be otherwise, but the Johnson
opinion also states that the father was present throughout the
pregnancy, labor and delivery of the dead fetus.1 " Contemporane-
ous observance cannot be contested since the parents heard the
news of the negligent conduct from the physicians and engaged all
their sensory faculties in the deliverance of the dead child.155 Fi-
nally, our society recognizes the strong emotional ties between par-
ents and their children. All three factors are undeniably fulfilled;
the parents' injuries are foreseeable. Once agian, the Johnson case
presents a clear opportunity for recovery in North Carolina under
a more progressive theory on negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 156
No doubt that problems exist with the Dillion test. Who is to
say that a parent will not just as likely endure emotional injury
upon hearing the news by telephone? Perhaps a non-relative or
distant relative would be more emotionally damaged than a parent
or a sibling. These questions make the Dillion test guidelines ap-
pear arbitrary. Perhaps no theory exists that accounts for every
possible variable or scenario. Yet, slight arbitrariness is better than
the basic unfairness of denying a remedy to one who has suffered a
wrong at the hands of another.
The above analysis indicates that the theories on negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress caused by concern for another under-
went progressive development without universal agreement. Each
theory requires limiting factors to be present prior to recovery. Al-
though the limiting factors are different in each theory, there exist
the common thread of concern for ensuring genuine claims and
limiting liability. More important to North Carolina, is the realiza-
153. See supra note 54.
154. Johnson, 89 N.C. App. at 169-170, 365 S.E.2d at 918.
155. Id.
156. It is noted that on July 28, 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit favorably cited the Johnson v. Ruark holding in upholding a
similar North Carolina claim. The federal court accepted the Johnson rationale in
holding that the parents' claim for emotional distress arising out of a wrongful
death or wrongful life action of their children should not have been denied as a
matter of law. Gallagher v. Duke, 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988). The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court had not rendered a decision on Johnson as of publication of
this Note.
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tion that other jurisdictions utilize more just theories of liability
and prove the theories reliable. North Carolina can benefit from
the experimentation and experience of these other jurisdictions by
adopting one of these theories. Consequently, this move would pro-
vide a fairer remedy for plaintiffs suffering from negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress caused by concern for another.
CONCLUSION
In Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, the court held that recovery
was proper in a viable fetus wrongful death action for the parents'
claim in their own right for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress caused by concern for another. Applying the North Carolina
impact/physical injury theory, the court held that injury to the fe-
tus was impact on the mother. The court also held in allowing the
father's claim, that the father's mental injury, if proven, sufficed
for physical injury.
Basically, the recovery in Johnson is proper by directly apply-
ing established North Carolina law. However, Johnson presents
the first major case which tests the court's concern for floodgate
litigation in response to allowing the viable fetus wrongful death
claim in DiDonato. The court will be forced to make a decision
between its reluctance to expand DiDonato and its desire to allow
recovery for a meritorious claim.
Over the past century, other jurisdictions in this country have
expanded their theories of liability for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress beyond the impact/physical injury theory.
These theories include allowing recovery for: first, plaintiffs in situ-
ations with a special likelihood of resulting emotional distress; sec-
ond, plaintiffs within the zone of danger; and third, plaintiffs
whose emotional injury is reasonably foreseeable. Each of these
theories has proven reliable in assuring genuine claims and limiting
liability. Not only is recovery proper under the North Carolina im-
pact/physical injury rule, but Johnson should also be affirmed
under each of the alternative theories discussed. During this stage
of progress in other jurisdictions, North Carolina has had little op-
portunity to adopt a new theory on liability.
The parents' claim for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress arising from concern for another has been shown to be a
natural extension of the viable fetus wrongful death action under
each theory in our country. The Johnson case provides the North
Carolina courts with a fact situation where recovery is proper
under any of the above theories of liability. Why should the court
1988]
23
Batchelor: Tort Law - The Expansion of the Viable Fetus Wrongful Death Actio
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988
114 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:91
refuse to adopt one of the more just theories of liability when af-
firming the Johnson decision?
Bruce Batchelor
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